

11 October 1956

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memo Directed @ 9 Oct. draft (not later)

One illustration of the cause of my feeling of malaise about the black-and-whiteness of the main conclusions of this briefing paper -- there is reference to the series of visits to Belgrade, past, present and coming, of satellite leaders and representatives of free World Communist parties (the French and Longo of Italy) -- without there being any balancing suggestion to offset the possible impression that all this activity represents a triumph for Tito. In other words, as I read this briefing paper I am left with the impression that others might interpret it as meaning that we ~~look~~ ^{look} on all these visits as so many trips to ~~Knesses~~ ^{CANDIDA}, whereas in point of fact it is my hunch that these Communist visitors are apt to be speaking to Tito in accents quite similar to those of Khrushchev. Taking into account the coloration and standing of the individual visitors themselves, it seems highly unlikely to me that they will be prostrating themselves before Tito and even more unlikely that they will be cooking up new conspiracies against the Kremlin at this time. They are more apt to be pleading with Tito to taper off in his disruptive actions and stop making so much trouble for them. Possibly they will be arguing that he should forego or postpone some of his more progressive lines in the greater interest of the welfare of the "World Socialist camp".

My next point is that the news received yesterday of the dispatch to Russia of a delegation of Yugoslav military staff officers is, in my opinion, susceptible of the interpretation that this is a part of the Yugoslav accommodation of Soviet views and desires -- and may even have been a part

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of the compromise formula arrived at during the recent exchange of visits.

If this assumption were correct, would it not cut somewhat against the conclusion that there is a deep division between the Yugoslavs and the Russians?

Obviously the news of the new Molotov appointment could be of the greatest significance, depending upon what this job really is and will amount to. If Molotov is, in fact, being set up as a kind of cultural czar, this would seem to indicate that Khrushchev has had to make an important concession in retreat from his former position regarding both Molotov personally and Khrushchev's strong advocacy of the new course. It also brings up reminiscences of the role played by Zhdanov when he held a similar position, and even carries a suggestion that there may be something more than we have thus far seen in the nature of a Soviet determination to recreate an international control mechanism along the lines of the COMINFORM.

It is my impression that we have reasonably good evidence that this was one of the points of contention between Tito and the Russians during the recent exchange of visits.

In general, it is my own feeling that we do not yet have enough evidence and moreover that it will require the passage of more time before we can see clearly the meaning of these latest developments. It is conceivable that even the return to positions of high party authority of such persons as Gomulka and Nagy could have Soviet consent in that this may all be part of a general pattern of effort to get matters back into the basket -- by subtler means. In other words, it is possible that the Russians

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feel that things have gone so far in terms of popular opinion and Communist Party developments in the satellites as to require some temporary sops to this opinion, and that the situation could become more controllable in the longer run if these concessions were granted and the people of the satellites given the feeling that the new course is not being reversed. | The hooker would come

if, after a period of, say, a year or so, and after the animals have been quieted down, these "rightist deviationists" were to be put aside once more. |

Summing up, I have the impression that the audience may come away from

this briefing with the thought that the division between the Kremlin and Tito is both deeper and sharper than it is in fact the case, and also that

the Soviet problem with the satellites is well nigh insurmountable for them. As regards the former, both parties have too much at stake to risk

a real break and ~~know~~ their tendency to find as much ground of agreement as possible would be mutual and ~~strongly~~ strong. I do not go quite as far

in my own thinking as Ambassador Bohlen when he says "This seems to me like a lovers' quarrel and these things usually wind up either in the divorce courts or in the hay -- and I am inclined to the latter conclusion" --

it is worth some thought. As regards the second point I think we should give the Russians some greater capabilities than we seem to be doing in this briefing, for getting matters sorted out and ultimately back on the track -- even though admittedly this is requiring and will continue to require some extremely delicate and difficult balancing and maneuvering.

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DOES DDC
WISH TO
PROJECT
THIS FAR?

IMPOSSIBLE
TO GET
THIS
"IMPRESSION"
IF BRIEFING
IS READ AND
UNDERSTOOD

SEE IV
E FOR
SAME
STATEMENT

SEE
VIII, B4C,
AND IX
B-2 FOR
SAME
STATEMENT